Dear Brother/Sister
FBU defends vital BA procedures
This circular brings to the attention of all FBU members an important safety matter concerning the use of Breathing Apparatus. While the specific matter originates in one fire and rescue service (London Fire Brigade) it has implications for all services and for all firefighters. This issue arises from the crisis in building safety highlighted by the Grenfell Tower disaster. Since Grenfell (indeed even before then) it has become clear that building safety in much of the UK has been compromised by lax regulation, poor research, lack of adequate enforcement action, by cost cutting and profit seeking. These problems have emerged over 40 years under different governments and the crisis has been exacerbated by huge cuts in public services, including our own. We understand and share the concerns of senior management in the fire and rescue service that these failures in building safety puts residents at risk. The solution is to demand that these failings are corrected. Measures which undermine the safety of firefighters will do nothing at all to improve public safety.
For some time officials in the London region, on the Executive Council and at Head Office have been contesting the introduction of a proposed policy on breathing apparatus (BA) by the London Fire Brigade which we have identified as dangerous. If introduced it would have allowed firefighters to be deployed beyond the bridgehead at fires on upper floors of tall buildings wearing BA but not under air. As this circular explains, the matter was referred via an LFB mechanism for resolving disagreements on health and safety matters for independent scrutiny and recommendation. We can report that the outcome is that the union was successful in this process.
It was vital that we achieved this outcome in the interests of firefighters’ safety and the safety of the members of the public who find themselves trapped by fire who need rescuing by firefighters. Whilst the policy was challenged in the London Fire Brigade – it has repercussions for the few other fire and rescues services which have introduced similar arrangements.
Consultation on this policy for fighting fire in tall buildings (known as policy note 633) began as a consequence of the pressures to introduce changes to high rise firefighting policy following the Grenfell Tower fire.
LFB’s draft policy included proposed elements in respect of emergency evacuation and mass rescue, in circumstances where total building failure had occurred. The LFB’s draft policy would have required/allowed incident commanders at high rise fires to deploy firefighters to work beyond the entry control point at the bridgehead without first having started up their breathing apparatus.
On 14 April 2021, head office and London FBU officials participated in presenting the matter to independent technical scrutiny using a mechanism called the LFB’s Health and Safety Advisory Panel. This process comprises a written submission by each of the two parties to the disagreement which are then presented to a meeting of the panel members. The panel consists of two representatives from each party (FBU and LFB management) and an independent chair. The Panel chair is a suitably qualified person who is mutually acceptable to both sides of the London Fire Brigade’s joint health and safety committee. In this instance the person selected was Mr Andrew Strawson, a former HSE inspector with long and well-respected experience of fire service matters.
Accordingly, the FBU made a detailed written submission to the Panel supplemented by a verbal presentation. The union set out the case that the proposed policy was unsafe because it would:
- Be in breach of a Fire Authority’s obligations as set out in the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and associated regulations
- Remove a reasonably practicable control measure
- Reduce the level of safety below that which is known to be reasonably practicable to achieve
- Overturn decades of BA safe practice
- Ignore lessons learnt from previous firefighter deaths, injuries and BA emergencies, such as the 2003 Petershill Court fire in Strathclyde
- Knowingly place BA teams beyond the point of rescue
- Completely remove the responsibilities of the BA Entry Control Officer and their ability to monitor and supervise the wear
- Breach PPE regulations and would undermine and render firefighter PPE ineffective. It would further require firefighters to commit a breach of the same regulations
- Undermine vital BA pre-entry checks and safe systems of work
- Render it impossible for BA teams to calculate working duration and safe turn-around pressures
- Expose firefighters to toxic fire effluents and other substances hazardous to health
- Undermine public safety by the potential to hamper fire ground operations, rescue efforts and redirect resources
- Not make buildings safer
- Offer no identifiable benefit to public safety.
Recommendations made by the Chair of the Health and Safety Advisory Panel
The independent chair concluded after hearing the arguments from both sides that LFB should withdraw the proposed unsafe procedure of sending firefighters beyond the entry control point when not under air. The recommendations are:
49. My recommendation is that the proposed procedure in Para 6.30 of the latest draft of PN633 be removed as it does not represent appropriate and best practice at fires in high-rise buildings.
50. In the course of the Panel deliberations it appeared that there were some inconsistencies and omissions in the proposed procedure. I am not of the opinion that rectifying these inconsistencies and omissions would change the recommendation.
The report, recommendations and associated documents can be found on the FBU website here:
https://www.fbu.org.uk/news/2021/05/13/fbu-defends-vital-breathing-apparatus-safety-procedures
Next steps
The FBU welcomes the LFB’s participation in the panel and indeed their subsequent adoption of the recommendations in full. This finding has significance beyond the London Fire Brigade. We have been made aware that some other FRSs have similar arrangements or are considering them. Fire and rescue authorities and their Chief Fire Officers in every service which has introduced similar arrangements should work with FBU health and safety representatives in order to take immediate steps to remove this practice and any such policies. The FBU is fully committed to identifying and negotiating new high rise policies that learn the lessons from the Grenfell Tower fire. However the FBU cannot accept the introduction of any procedures that put firefighters at greater risk.
It was an absolute necessity for the FBU to challenge this policy on behalf of all professional firefighters whether members or not. No other fire and rescue service organisation or body, including other ‘representative bodies’, challenged this unsafe practice, which would have led to firefighter deaths; serious injuries to firefighters and would have seriously compromised rescue operations at incidents. It has been highly disappointing that the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) has produced national guidance that would also permit the proposed procedure.
The NFCC must now remove their unsafe and misguided guidance as a matter of urgency. We are clear that such policies, if introduced, would be unlawful. Any failure by Chief Fire Officers or individual employers to promptly address the issues identified by this panel will be addressed rigorously. The union will challenge this practice wherever it is raised, utilising all legal, political and industrial resources at our disposal. Although others stay silent, the FBU can never compromise on firefighter and public safety.
The FBU will make a range of publications available explaining this vital health and safety matter. We shall also arrange briefing meetings to discuss these important developments. The union would like all members to attend these meetings and take up the matter in their own fire and rescue service.
Yours in unity
Matt Wrack
General Secretary
