Each month we will be providing an update on the evidence coming out of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry.
Since the Inquiry resumed in on 8 February 2021, hearings have been held via video call after a resurgence in coronavirus cases saw another lockdown put in place across the United Kingdom.
Module two, which began in November 2020, has looked at the manufacturers, testing and certification of the products used in the refurbishment of Grenfell and concluded this week. It has revealed shocking evidence about the companies responsible for the deadly cladding system at Grenfell Tower.
Arconic is the multinational firm that manufactured of the ACM Polyethylene (PE) cladding panels used on Grenfell Tower. These were identified as the “primary cause” of fire spread up the building in the inquiry’s Phase 1 report. Despite this, three of Arconic’s former senior employees have refused to attend. Only Claude Schmidt –president of the French-arm of the company –agreed to answer questions at the last minute.
Mr Schmidt accepted Arconic staff “misled” and “lied” to its customers about the safety of its ACM panels.
Arconic knew how dangerous they were as early as 2007. In September of that year, Arconic marketing manager Gerard Sonntag attended an event during which a presentation on ACM panels described the fuel power of a polyethylene (PE) core – the substance sandwiched between the aluminium composite panels - on a project of 5000 square metres as being equivalent to a truck of 19,000 litres of oil. However, Arconic continued to sell the product.
The Inquiry later heard how the prevalence of this panel in other European markets had diminished over time due to changes in regulation relating to fire performance, but the UK remained a market because UK regulations permitted its sale.
The British Research Establishment (BRE) is the testing body that carried out key fire tests on the Kingspan and Celotex insulation products later used on Grenfell Tower.
Evidence from Phil Clark, a senior technician at the BRE, showed that as a result of the privatisation of BRE in 1997, testing the fire performance of external cladding systems became a source of revenue, leading to the body becoming closely linked to corporations and the need to test for profit.
The Inquiry heard of a serious ‘list of omissions and missed instances’ that allowed dangerous materials to receive a pass from the BRE. During a 2014 large-scale test for Celotex RS5000 insulation boards, Clark failed to notice that fire-resisting boards had been added to the test-rig. This meant the product was considered ‘suitable for use’ on high-rise buildings.
RS5000 insulation is made up of Polyisocyanurate (PIR), which is rigid plastic foam that produces lethal gases when it burns, including hydrogen cyanide and carbon monoxide, which cause rapid incapacitation when inhaled, preventing escape – it is understood that nearly all the victims of the Grenfell fire died of smoke inhalation.
A failure of due diligence
The British Board of Agrément (BBA) is the UK construction sector’s main certifying body that issued certificates for Arconic’s cladding panels and Kingspan’s insulation boards.
Evidence from BBA showed that staff did not have sufficient information from either Arconic or Kingspan to issue and re-issue safety certificates. Despite repeated requests, Arconic had not supplied key information to the BBA about the testing and classifications of its panels, meaning that an earlier certificate that Arconic used to sell its product, was ‘materially wrong’.
Head of Approvals at the BBA, Chris Hunt, issued a certificate for Kingspan’s K15 insulation, but did not insist on seeing proof that the product had achieved a Class 0 fire rating - meaning that a product can adequately resist the spread of fire.
Kingspan
Over the last week, the Inquiry has heard more details on how, in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire, Kingspan sought to undermine the Government’s proposed ban on combustible materials for use over 18 metres.
Almost immediately after the fire, Kingspan launched a campaign to lobby the Government on the use of combustible materials on high-rise buildings and hired a number of PR and communications firms. Its intention was to undermine confidence in other products, particularly non-combustible insulation.
Kingspan sought to obtain access to and to exert influence over a targeted list of MPs and key decision-makers including MPs Michael Gove, Sajid Javid and Amber Rudd. On 23 January 2018, Kingspan representative Mark Harris attended a dinner at the House of Commons, along with other MPs, including Kevin Hollinrake MP, where they discussed Kingspan’s position, namely that the combustibility of individual materials is irrelevant and compliance should only be achieved through the very testing that the Inquiry has shown to be deeply flawed.
Profiteering and de-regulation
Arconic, Celotex and Kingspan – intent on accessing the lucrative UK high rise market – were able to exploit a flawed testing and certification regime to achieve a seal of approval for their lethal products.
The evidence revealed during Module two of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has been a damning illustration of how deadly a combination of the UK’s watered-down safety regulations, rampant privatisation and corporate power can be.
Module three begins on 29 March 2021. It will look at the fire safety measures internal to the tower, the management of the building, compliance with regulations, the fire risk assessment and complaints and communications with residents of the tower.
