The Fire Brigades Union has termed a new report to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, released to the public today, “massively significant” evidence.
The report, written by Professor Luke Bisby, a professor of fire and structures at Edinburgh University and an expert witness to the inquiry, details the flaws with the Building Research Establishment (BRE), the government’s former safety research and testing body that was privatised in 1997. It was responsible for testing many of the cladding, insulation and other building materials used in the Grenfell refurbishment.
The report details previous cladding fires which can be viewed as missed opportunities to prevent Grenfell, and BRE failures around them. It also builds up a picture of BRE only doing work within contracts, and only specific things – close to client and government demands - within those contracts.
Bisby concludes that “what emerges from this overview of the development of England's building regulatory environment, and the major cladding fires that have occurred during the same period, is a picture of increasing freedom for industry…”. He also highlights a “profound lack of competence of actors” including the BRE [both page 253] and “powerful commercial and ideological objectives” to increase flexibility for industry.
The union believes that many of these flaws can be explained by the privatisation of BRE and the creeping, increasing influence of the private sector in the BRE in the years running up to the completion of full privatisation.
Mark Rowe, Fire Brigades Union national officer, said:
“Professor Bisby’s report details multiple failings on the BRE’s part in the run-up to Grenfell, failings which were caused – fundamentally – by private ownership and the increasing encroachment of the private sector. It is massively significant.
“We are clear: the BRE was not, and is not, fit for purpose, because it is privately-owned. It is vital that the BRE is taken back into public ownership and run for the public good, not profit.
“In the run-up to Grenfell their status as a private company meant that they were dependent on fee income from clients, such as Grenfell manufacturers. This made them too willing to please clients and too reluctant to challenge them or the information they provided. The BRE’s private status also meant it did not share information as it should have done, and there were basic failures of competence in vital areas.”
The Fire Brigades Union represents firefighters and control staff, including many of those who were involved in the response to Grenfell. It is a core participant to the inquiry.
The report is centred around Building Research Establishment failures, mainly in relation to key cladding fires:
- Around the Knowsley Heights fire in 1991 the BRE “had a significant organisational incentive to enable overcladding solutions whilst being seen to mitigate their fire risks – rather than prohibit their use” (page 253), with the BRE having significant “reputational investment” here (p100), and the failure to “properly interrogate the key issues” here is “tragic” (p99).
According to Bisby the BRE report has a “striking absence of any explicit discussion regard the degree to which the GRP rainscreen product may have contributed fuel to the fire” (page 98). The GRP rainscreen product was later found to have contributed to the fire (also page 98).
Bisby includes a handwritten note detailing a Department of Environment press office request to BRE to “play down the issue of the fire” (p104).
- Following the Garnock Court fire in 1999 there were “surprising oversights” made by the BRE with regards to a lack of investigation of cladding and other materials, and possible implications for building regulation (p125). “It is not clear” why a later, more detailed set of reports was not properly communicated to government or Parliament by BRE (page 136).
Around this fire there was an insight into how BRE worked and prioritised work: "We are a private sector organisation; we are not part of government. Clearly, in days gone by, when we were part of DoE then this work was done and would have been done in the public interest without the need for formal contract. One regrets there are now commercial pressures that require clients to place formal contracts with us before we can undertake work." (BRE comments to the select committee on Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs, page 131).
- A BRE report on the Lakanal House fire “contains very little insight” into the roles of combustible materials in and on the walls in the fire’s development. Bisby expresses surprise that there was a lack of comment around the external fire spread at Lakanal (from p186 - para 1046, 1049, 1052, 1055, 1058) and the questions this should have raised in relation to building regulations.
- The “BRE "External Fire Spread" Reports (2014-2016) are in places incomprehensible, and they appear to lack in any real insights or practical significance” (page 229).
- As early as 2017 the BRE – as well as government – was aware of regulatory confusion that would later help lead to combustible material being used in the Grenfell refurbishment, but “it appears that little or no action was taken” by the BRE “to seek to highlight or mitigate this confusion or the resulting significant hazards” (page 255).
