Health And Safety

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIC OVERVIEW BY THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Published and circulated by the Executive Council, December 2000

Foreword

As part of an overall review of how our union perceived and tackled the many issues which concern and affect our members, I asked each of our National Officers to prepare discussion papers on their references.

This paper was presented to the Executive Council in September of 2000 by Brother Dave Patton, the National Officer with responsibility for Health, Safety, and Welfare.

The document was then discussed by Regions and finally endorsed by the Executive Council at their December 2000 meeting.

As can be seen, the Union has now embarked on a radical rethink of our strategies and policies in all areas of HSW.

I share the Executive Council’s concerns over the Health, Safety, and Welfare of our members, and consider it to be an area of crucial importance for the coming years.

The last decade of the last millennium saw 27 of our members lose their lives at incidents. By any reckoning that is too high a price to have paid by any industry, but particularly one which is allegedly a uniformed and disciplined service.

For far too long the fire service has considered how we respond to orders, rather than the content of those orders.

More attention has been paid to how smart we appear in our working rig rather than ensuring that it protects us from our working environment.

In short, our Health, Safety, and Welfare has not received the attention it has deserved. Working in the fire service is not a hazardous occupation; it only becomes so when our safety is ignored.

The health and welfare of our members must be our prime concern in every area of our negotiations with our employers, whether locally or nationally.

A safe working environment is not negotiable; it is ours by right.’

INDEX

INTRODUCTION

1. SAFETY IN THE FIRE SERVICE

2. H&S STRUCTURES & STRATEGIES WITHIN THE FBU

3. MANAGING SAFELY?

4. THE EMPLOYERS’ ROLE

5. THE ROLE OF THE INSPECTORATES

6. INITIATIVES AT NATIONAL LEVEL

CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

This document outlines the concerns of the Executive Council on many aspects of the safety, health, and welfare of our members, and the measures we must take if we are to effect lasting change.

It is the belief of the Executive Council that those who have the responsibility for H&S in the Fire Service, whether Employers; Managers; Inspectorates; Enforcement Agencies, or indeed ourselves, must radically alter their outlook and strategic approach.

It is our contention that not only has the HASWA failed to protect our members, but that in recognising this fact and failing to make an adequate response, then all concerned must share the blame for the present situation.

Past and present strategies, and responses to those issues which clearly have an effect on the well being of our members, must be critically examined in the light of experience.

With the Health and Safety at Work Act having celebrated its Twenty-Fifth birthday, we are entitled to ask;

• Why near misses; accidents; injuries, and work related ill health are still everyday occurrences.
• Why death and serious injuries, caused by such events, still happen with appalling regularity.
• Why the numbers of legal claims for personal injuries are rising rather than falling.

If we were to extrapolate recent statistics in accidents and fatalities, then within the next Ten years we could conceivably see a further twenty to thirty firefighters killed at incidents with a corresponding rise in the number of injuries, permanent disabilities, and ill health retirements among all sections of our membership.

These figures of course, take no account of the number of dangerous occurrences or ‘near misses’. At present the collation of these incidents is at best haphazard, but if properly recorded would give invaluable guidance toward preventing them becoming accidents in the future.

These suppositions rest on the premise that nothing new will happen to radically alter the present situation. That the present numbers of deaths, injuries, and illnesses will not rise, or that their causes will not materially alter.

Conversely, and as claimed in some quarters, these statistics may be no more than a “blip”.

We can’t afford the luxury of waiting to see.

The Executive Council does not claim to have the answers to all of the safety problems now facing the service, and as with Fairness at work, the FBU cannot, and indeed must not attempt to solve all of the problems by ourselves.

However, after consultation throughout the Fire Brigades Union, this document outlines various short, medium, and long-term strategies, policies and initiatives.

Some of these initiatives propose a major departure from our present structures, systems, and responses, and while some of the suggestions may appear radical, if we are to successfully tackle the many problems we face, then we must urgently examine our attitude and responses to safety issues within the service.

If adopted, the proposals outlined in this document should take us at least some way toward reducing the horrendous toll now exacted upon our members’ safety, health and welfare while simply doing their job.

We must raise the profile and status of safety, health, and welfare within the FBU.

The Executive Council adopted this document at their December 2000 meeting.

1. SAFETY IN THE FIRE SERVICE?

The introduction of the HASWA in 1974, with the Safety reps and Safety Committee Regulations following in ’78, led many of us to hope that here at last was a means of solving some, if not all, of our safety problems. We would have statutory rights of inspection, reporting, and controlling the safety of our members. The fact that the HASWA was also an enabling act led us to expect future detailed legislation, which would be distilled into simplified codes of practice. In short, the trade union movement broadly welcomed the general aims and objectives of the new act.

However, all contemporary analysis clearly shows that employers and managers (including, and for the purposes of this document, specifically the fire service,) are now failing in their responsibilities to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of their employees. There are some obvious reasons;

• Deregulation of business during the Thatcher years;
• Financial constraints on the HSE budget;
• Change of emphasis to a more ‘business friendly’ approach;
• CACFOA’s attempt to have us exempted from the Act, with a consequential, and lasting attitude of at best, grudging acceptance.

(The recently published document by the DETR / HSE; REVITALISING HEALTH & SAFETY, finally recognises that there are serious failings in the delivery of improvements.)

However, if we merely recognise and accept these facts, and make no attempt to change our own overall strategy, then we must accept that we, as a union, are also failing our members.

The never-ending stream of claims to our legal department for illness, injuries, ill health and deaths sustained on duty, suggests that the introduction of the HASWA, and all subsequent legislation, does not appear to have substantially improved the overall safety of our members.

Conversely, it could be argued that without the present legislation, accidents, injuries, and fatalities would now be even higher than those which we presently find unacceptable. What is beyond doubt however, is that whatever the reasons, our members are paying for this failure with their health, and in some cases, their lives.

The legislation is seriously flawed and regularly flouted.

It is of course pure speculation as to whether or not accident and injury figures would indeed be higher without the current methods of firefighting, PPE, or control and command based on the requirements of the present legislation.

What is clearly not speculation however, is that such has been the rise in the numbers of reportable accidents, injuries and fatalities that the Health and Safety Executive have reclassified the Fire Service to a ‘Class A, At Risk Industry’. We now find ourselves with the same appalling safety record, and viewed in the same light, as the Construction Industry.

So that;

• After Twenty-Five years of general legislation
• Detailed, and quite specific Codes of Practice;
• Over Twenty years involvement by dedicated safety reps;
• Not one, but two Inspectorates;
• Countless Joint Committees, fire manuals, training manuals, DCO’s etc.,

we find that the fire service, as an industry, is causing not only more injuries overall, but that these injuries are ever more complex, diverse, and serious in nature.

And that sadly, in recent years, we have seen a return to the bad old days when the deaths of firefighters were not unusual.

If we are to effect genuine and sustainable improvements in the safety regime of the fire service, then we must embark on a radical rethink of all aspects of safety. We must, as in the case of Equal Opportunities, be prepared to tackle the problems in partnership with employers, managers, and inspectors. Simply blaming them for the cause and effect, while legally and morally correct, will not in itself guarantee the safety, or improve the health and overall welfare of our members.

However, and again drawing on experience gained during the fairness at work campaign, we must also be prepared for a reactionary element within those organisations already mentioned. We must be aware that we may be fighting for improvements against certain organisations and individuals, rather than with them.

We will be prepared, once again, to give the lead in a matter crucial to the well being of all those who work in the fire service.

2. H&S STRUCTURE WITHIN THE FBU

The Union’s 1977 Annual Conference agreed the Executive Council statement on the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974. (HASWA)

In asking delegates to support the document, the General Secretary, Terry Parry, outlined both the measures we would employ, and the structures we would put in place. This would involve appointing and training Safety Representatives, and forming Safety Committees as provided under the Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations. (SRSC)

During the debate, Terry made the point that if we were to be successful in the field of H&S then;

‘The suggestion we are making is that we keep the question of safety representatives within the union itself because it would be very silly to appoint separate safety reps not attached to the Fire Service and there might well be conflict.’

(’77 report of proceedings. P96)

Although Terry’s point was made in relation to plans by some Trade Unions to employ safety specialists as safety reps, nevertheless the fear was there that H&S might, in the future, go off at a tangent.

Speaking in the same debate, London’s Trevor Jones amplified those fears when he told conference;

‘It is obviously good sense to keep safety representatives and conditions within our existing union structure.’

He then went on to warn conference;

‘...if all else fails we may end up falling back on traditional methods, in which case our safety representatives will have a need for authority from the union officials.’

Brother P. Tharby from Essex, speaking in the same debate told delegates;

‘The health and safety we are going to want inside the Fire Service under the Act is going to be on the amount of muscle that we use.’

The Executive Council found those comments to be remarkable in their depth of understanding of the problems we may encounter if we were to ‘get it wrong’.

They are of course, as relevant now as they were Twenty-three years ago; indeed, with the benefits of hindsight, we could say that those words were not a warning, but a prophecy.

The tragedy is therefore, that with over Twenty-three years experience of the Safety Reps Regs, we have fallen into some of the traps which the ’77 conference warned us about.

It is now apparent, that although our safety reps are indeed union members and officials, in some respects they would appear to be separate from our main industrial work.

We must ask ourselves; if it was wrong then, is it right now?

And once again, we need to examine whether or not our present structures, procedures, rules and practices adequately addresses the needs of our members.

For instance;

• Is H&S often perceived as a “bolt-on” accessory to our core industrial work as a Trade Union, and if so, how would we bring it back into the mainstream of our industrial activity?
• Are some of our officials wary of H&S, believing it to be a highly specialised subject with a morass of legislation to learn and understand; that if they become involved they must attend education seminars and possibly attain some qualifications?
• Is becoming an H&S rep seen as a dead end job within our structures?

We need to ascertain whether or not we have made H&S appear too specialised, that those who become safety reps are almost automatically debarred from dealing with “normal” union issues.

Conversely, we must also ensure that our officials, from Branch Rep to NEC member will, and indeed can, deal with H&S matters on a daily basis, not leaving it to the specialist safety reps but calling on them when and if required.

In short, what Terry Parry, Trevor Jones, and P. Tharby warned us of, has, in many respects, come to pass.

3. MANAGING SAFETY?

‘It is going to be very hard for some management to believe that there is a Health & Safety at Work Act.’

(Conference ’77; Terry Parry)

Terry’s statement, not surprisingly, is also not only just as relevant today as it was then, but again, prophetic.

Having failed in their attempt to have the Fire Service exempted from the Act, many CACFOA members and senior managers have at best dragged their heels on issues of H&S. Indeed our horrendous accident and injury records are daily proof that many have never entirely accepted their responsibilities and duties under the HASWA, or indeed the ethos of ‘safety first’ in general.

There still exists among many senior officers, and sadly some of our members and officials, the view that;

• Accidents are an unavoidable by-product of firefighting.
• That epidemic levels of stress among our Control and Officer members are part and parcel of a ‘modern’ Fire Service.
• That we will never entirely eradicate accidents, injuries, and even deaths among our members.

“It’s a dangerous job” still holds sway in the general psyche of the service.

We must, as a priority, tackle this perception.

For as long as accidents and ill-health are perceived as inevitable, then there will be an “acceptable” number of fatalities and injuries. A ‘glass bottom’ we will not only have to accept, but in accepting it, never make the attempt to break through to achieve zero.

We must challenge and change the widely held perception of the service, including that of our members, that our job is in itself inherently hazardous.

We must transform that belief to one where we are seen as dealing with potentially hazardous situations – safely.

For example;

• We must demand staffing levels in control rooms which don’t require our members to work the horrendous overtime hours the are regularly expected to.
• We must renegotiate the hours our Flexible Duty officer members are expected to work.
• We must ensure that our control and command, training, proper risk assessments and PPE, allows our firefighters to deal with any given situation with the expectation that they will complete the task entirely unscathed.

No other industry accepts deaths and accidents as an unavoidable by-product of its main field of operations.

An indication of the perceived wisdom of senior managers within the service was given to an audience at the 1997 CACFOA conference.

In a speech, their outgoing president, CO Jeremy Beech is quoted as saying that the HSE inspectors were ‘an irritant and a distraction.’

To date, no one from that organisation has either corrected, or apologised for that statement.

It has become clear over the years, that the grudging acceptance CACFOA give to safety and health generally comes after an improvement notice or a prosecution. And normally as a result of the death or serious injury of one or more of our members, although occasionally we have seen the HSE acting on their own initiative, as in Berkshire and Highlands and Islands.

Even in those brigades which have been served improvement notices or prosecutions, the safety culture rarely permeates down the ranks to those who will deal with our members’ safety and health on a daily basis – junior ranks. Very few brigades have completed risk assessment training, indeed some haven’t yet begun.

Deaths and injuries to our members, it would appear, are the price we must pay for working in a ‘dangerous job.’

Various indicators exist to prove the point that those charged with ensuring our safety often do not take their responsibilities seriously, or in some cases abrogate that responsibility almost entirely. e.g.

• An FBU document showing the costs to our employers of accidents in the service went largely unnoticed by most managers and employers.
• Prosecutions and improvement notices are resented and seen as unwarranted.
• The HSE inspectors are seen as “irritants, and distractions”. (J. Beech ex CFO Kent)
• Being appointed as Brigade Safety Officer is normally seen as nothing more than part of an officer’s career progression.

We will therefore, strive ever harder to persuade senior managers to willingly take on their responsibilities. But in the meantime, and for those who may never be convinced, we will adopt an alternative strategy.

Where persuasion fails then we will adopt sterner measures.

Senior managers must be forced, by law if necessary, to take the welfare, safety and health of our members seriously. They must begin to accept the responsibilities of their rank.

• We will, with our solicitors, target those senior managers held to have been responsible when our members are injured, maimed, or killed.
• We will adopt a policy of naming and shaming those Brigades responsible.
• We will take action against those brigades who ignore the implementation of Regulations or Codes of Practice.

4. THE EMPLOYERS’ ROLE

Terry Parry also warned us that employers who were unaware of, or shirked their responsibilities under the Act, would compound the dangers posed by the reluctance of fire service managers;

‘We will have to make employers aware that there is an Act and they cannot tell it to go away because they have a duty and we will not permit that to be forgotten.’

That task remains outstanding.

The Union recently won an improvement to the Grey Book Scheme of Conditions of Service by the inclusion of Section XII, ‘Fairness at Work’.

This now means that Maternity Leave and Maternity Support Leave, Parental Leave, Adoption Leave etc, are now recognised by all as part of our conditions of service and therefore disputable.

The preface to the Scheme states that;

“…the Scheme accordingly represents the terms and conditions of employment for the uniformed members of the brigades of all local authorities in the United Kingdom….”

In light of the recently published documents;

• Revitalising Health & Safety. (DETR & HSE)
• Securing Health Together. (HSE)
• Fit For Duty. (HMI)

We will test our employer’s commitment to a true partnership approach. We will table with the employers our demand that a new section; ‘Section XIII: Health, Safety and Welfare, be introduced into the Grey Book. This would include;

The right to a safe and healthy working environment;

Our right to properly funded and resourced Occupational Health Schemes;

Paid time off for our safety reps to receive training and carry out their duties.

The right to a safe and healthy working environment should be enshrined in our national conditions, allowing the subject to be debated at NJC level as well as on the purely advisory CFBAC, which of course has no dispute mechanism.

If H&S were on the NJC agenda, we would then be in a position to raise the subject itself with the employers directly, leaving the technical issues to the various CFBAC committees.

Highlighting the deficiencies of their senior managers, and making the employers collectively responsible for H&S matters will, we believe, also assist in raising the profile of the whole area of Health, Safety, and Welfare.

We will engage in dialogue with the employers nationally to seek agreement to re-categorise our Regional H&S Coordinators as roving safety reps in line with current TUC, HSE, and Government thinking, with joint funding from the brigades in that region for facility time etc.

We should not however expect a transformation overnight from the uncaring and belligerent attitude we have grown to expect from our employers. It may take more than debate and argument to bring them to a genuine understanding of the needs of their workforce.

In that event, we are prepared to persuade them by more direct methods.

In the past we have tended, quite correctly, to apportion blame to those directly responsible for our members’ safety; Chief Fire Officers and Firemasters. In future we will carefully consider whether a criminal conviction could be successfully brought against the Employers themselves.

Such a case would not replace a litigation claim for compensation, but would be in addition to any such claim. (Joint FBU / ASLEF / Thompsons Corporate Manslaughter Document)

However, even if such a case were not immediately possible, then it is our belief that the threat of such a course of action would bring about a transformation in attitude. If our employers were concerned over their own health with the prospect of a spell in prison, then they would surely ensure that Chief Officers would take our member’s safety more seriously.

Discussions with Thompsons leave us in no doubt that such a course of action is certainly feasible, although perhaps not initially achievable.

5. THE ROLE OF THE INSPECTORATES

The HSE Inspectorate now covers the vast majority of industries and workers. Unlike many groups of workers however, the Fire Service also has its own specific inspectorate; HM Inspector of Fire Services.

When it became apparent that in spite of objections from certain quarters, the Fire Service would indeed be covered by the HASWA, an accommodation was reached between the two Inspectorates.

But the HSE specifically took the view, (fire service circular 29/78) that;

…’the objective of regarding the adoption of training and operations procedures recommended by the Council, (CFBAC) as meeting the fire authority’s responsibility to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health safety and welfare of firefighters, was not attainable.’

The HSE said however, that provided that the authorities and the fire service staff organisations agreed;

‘it would be appropriate for the recommendations of the Council as a joint consultative body to be accepted as national guidelines on health and safety matters arising in fire service training and operations.’

The HSE, it was accepted, would be responsible for inspections of any issue arising from training and operations in the fire service

In particular an agreement was reached at the CFBAC that the HSE;

…’has agreed that its Inspectorate, who will have to deal with accidents, incidents complaints etc., involving the work of the fire service, should keep in close touch with HM inspectors of Fire Services and that close liaison should be maintained between the two inspectorates. To this end, the Factory (now HSE) Inspectors have been advised that they should consult the Fire Service Inspectorate about any general fire service problem which might arise from inspections and, in particular, before they consider any enforcement action under the Act.’

Those arrangements, it now appears, were somewhat idealistic and naïve.

The approach envisaged by the HSE, that the CFBAC would act as a Joint Consultative body promulgating best practice, has manifestly failed.

Proof of this lies in the varying degrees of compliance by brigades with recent legislation and guidance;

• The “Six pack”;
• First Aid regs;
• COSHH;
• Risk assessment.

And most recently, the joint DETR / HSE document, ‘REVITALISING HEALTH & SAFETY’ was published in June 2000. To date, (December 2000) that document has not been promulgated in the fire service. We have made informal approaches to the employers to co-host a major event of Employers, Managers, and the FBU to promote a major initiative at tripartite partnerships. To date, no response has been received.

Unless and until such times as the CFBAC is given the authority to issue ACOPs as opposed to DCOs, then individual fire brigades can, and regularly do ignore the guidance.

We can also now find enough evidence that the regular inspection of the fire service, in the field of training and operations, has been handed over entirely to HMI. It would appear that the only inspections now undertaken by the HSE are after a serious incident, or as a result of a specific complaint by one of our safety reps; and even then the response is often patchy and sporadic.

• Why, if the arrangements are effective, are we still frustrated in our attempts to force our employers to comply with, and implement recent legislation?
• Why, if the arrangements referred to above are effective, do we still have a horrendous safety record?
• Why are our Solicitors consistently able to recover substantial damages from Fire Authorities which either admit liability or are found at fault by the courts?
• Why do we allow a situation where retired CACFOA members are the inspectors of brigades which are under the command of current CACFOA members?
• Would the employers be happy if we were to suggest that in future our retired safety reps would form the inspection teams?

In pondering these questions, we must keep in mind points made elsewhere in this document;

• CACFOA’s attempt to win exemption from the Act on the grounds that our industry is highly safety conscious and had its own Inspectorate.
• They still resent the limited activities of the HSE. (CFO J. Beech in his farewell speech to CACFOA, where he described them as ‘an irritant and a distraction’)
• That the HMI consists almost entirely of retired senior officers.
• It is too much to expect that these individuals would have changed their antipathy toward the H&S act and our reps with their changed role.

The recent thematic reviews amply prove the point that HMI have never properly carried out their function. In the past, they have at best been incompetent.

Only when the recent thematic reviews were undertaken did we see a true picture of the Fire Service. The reasons for that are quite simply that experts in their particular fields, with no previous connection to the Fire Service, formed part of the inspection team.

The present arrangement and relationship between the two Inspectorates was agreed in 1978. We will seek a thorough external review of HMI. The criteria for appointment to the post should be decided at CFBAC level, and interviews for the posts conducted by, for example, the Fire Service Implementation Group of the CFBAC.

We will also attempt to re-focus the CFBAC to adequately fulfil its function as accepted by the HSE.

The HSE Inspectorate’s role must be extended to police the activities of HMI, as opposed to the present ‘partnership’ of equals approach.

6. INITIATIVES AT NATIONAL LEVEL

i) EXTERNAL

a) CFBAC

In light of the reorganisation of the CFBAC, this section will comment on the well recognised weaknesses of the previous structures.

However, there are certain issues we will table at a suitable point in time.

For instance:

• Qualified safety experts permanently employed as HMIs, who would carry out safety audits and deal with all H&S matters.
• A new method of promulgation following closely the model of Approved Codes of Practice at present allowed for, though rarely used, under the HASWA. These would undoubtedly have greater authority than the present DCOs etc.

b) New legislation

The aim of the previous Tory government to reduce the regulatory burden on employers resulted in them achieving their desired effect of seriously undermining the effectiveness of the present Act.

They accomplished this by enacting a series of measures designed to create a ‘business friendly atmosphere;’

• Instructions to H&S inspectors to adopt a ‘softly, softly’ approach when considering enforcement.
• New rights of appeal against enforcement decisions.
• Swingeing budget cuts.
• Parts of the HSE’s operations contracted-out.
• A reduction in their staffing levels.

Even with the recently published DETR / HSE document; ‘Revitalising Health & Safety’, many experts now believe that the time is ripe for a new Safety Act.

So that regardless of any success we may achieve in changing attitudes within the service and the Inspectorates, we will re-examine the present HASWA. Even if the present Act was to be fully enforced, and with a properly resourced and staffed inspectorate, it would still be fundamentally flawed. We need a Safety Act which would;

• Sweep away the self-regulatory practices we have at present.
• Have an enforcement authority and a structure of fines and penalties imposed by the courts.
• Have the authority to seek imprisonment for charges of corporate manslaughter.
• Provide the right for workers and unions to take civil action when employers are refusing to enact regulations etc. (we have already taken a case to the European Commission on this issue.)

Informal discussions have already taken place with a group of safety academics who share this view.

The group, the ‘Scottish Occupational Health and Safety Research Network’, (SOHSRN) was established to provide a professional resource, think tank, and discussion forum for trade unions and the broader working class movement.

Following the excellent example of the Union’s ‘Fire Safety Bill’, the EC will invite the founders of SOHSRN, Dr Charles Woolfson of Glasgow University, and Dr Mathias Beck of St Andrew’s University, to address a seminar. The objective would be to discuss the possibility of commissioning a new ‘Safety and Health in the Workplace Act’.

The costs of this project will probably be substantial, and if so we will approach the broader Trade Union movement to consider a jointly funded programme.

ii) INTERNAL

a) Branch / Brigade

In discussions with our Safety Reps, it quickly became apparent that in some brigades regular inspections of workplaces are not taking place; H&S is not always on the agenda at meetings, and we have varying degrees of compliance with regulations etc., even within the same Region.

We desperately need to collate and promulgate best practice for every aspect of our operations. We need to embark on a major inspection programme covering all workplaces.

We need nothing radical here.

We need, quite simply, to get back to basics.

b) The role and function of our H&S Coordinators

At present, we have a full time National Officer with responsibility for dealing with all issues concerning health, safety, and welfare. A full time official working from head office, with little or no contact with operational members, is too far removed from the day to day problems experienced by our members and being dealt with by our co-ordinators and safety reps.

Therefore;

• We have made permanent the four ad-hoc Sub-Committees formed to assist the process of formulating, and prioritising the various work plans;
• In order to co-ordinate the work of the Sub-committees and ensure implementation of strategies developed, a National Safety Committee (NSC) has been formed, chaired by the President and consisting of four Executive Council members.
• Agreed that part of the NSC responsibilities will be to follow the example set by the National Strategy Group for Fairness at Work in promoting and raising the awareness of our members on all H&S issues.
• The Committee will undertake an initial review of all aspects of our member’s safety and health with a report to the EC, hopefully, and perhaps optimistically, by the autumn of 2001. This will enable a document, if required, to be agreed by the EC for submission to the Union’s 2002 Annual Conference.
• Part of the work programme will be to glean information as the basis for a comprehensive database on policies, equipment, practices etc. from which a ‘best practice’ document will be distilled.

This of course entails a redefining of the Regional / Sectional Coordinator’s role as it stands at present. So that as well as co-ordinating activity within their present sphere of influence, they will also now have a role in sitting on the NSC sub-committees and assisting the NSC to identify and deal with problems being faced by our members, and again, and equally importantly, raise the profile of our H&S work.

c) Head office

If we are to collate statistics and consequently identify trends in the accidents and injuries to our members, we must first establish a method of ensuring that those details we receive are as comprehensive as possible. At present the most reliable data available is that held by the Legal and AIF department. This information is, we believe, only the tip of the iceberg. What we do not have is a reliable method of collecting, collating, and analysing unreported minor injuries, near misses, and dangerous occurrences.

In conjunction with the National Officer responsible for IT, we will engage in dialogue with our officials to establish a method of noting and passing on all relevant information on all incidents. This will include those incidents considered too minor to warrant either a legal, or AIF claim.

Identification, recording, and collation of near misses and dangerous occurrences are imperative if we are to prevent such events becoming accidents in the future. Again we will consult our officials and seek to establish a method which they will find uncomplicated and user friendly.

From these near misses and accident figures, we will extrapolate a set of ‘Brigade Performance Indicators on Health Safety & Welfare’ which will be published annually.

These will show;

• Total near misses.
• Total dangerous occurrences.
• Total accidents.
• Total deaths.
• Total claims won.
• Total damages recovered.
• Total days lost due to service injuries.
• Total medically discharged due to service injuries.
• Total uninsured losses.

Section two of the HASWA states that employers have a statutory responsibility for the Health, Safety, and Welfare of their employees.

However, the question of welfare is often either ignored or forgotten by both employers and employees. The strategy of pressurising the HSE to take action will be extended to those employers who have either allowed, or not taken steps to eradicate bullying and harassment. Similarly with those brigades with poor records for assisting members suffering from stress. Any resultant statistics will also become part of our annual ‘Brigade Performance Indicators on Health Safety & Welfare’.

For those brigades who;

• persistently refuse to take these issues seriously;
• who flout or ignore safety laws;
• or who deliberately breech H&S legislation,

we will serve own Provisional Improvement Notice (PIN) on management.

• Although at present these have no legal standing, they will serve notice on our employers, and will be copied to;The Fire Authority;
• HSE;
• HMI;
• Thompsons; (solicitors)
• Head Office.

Again, this strategy is raised in the DETR / HSE joint document, and is also in operation in certain Australian states.

CONCLUSIONS

The Executive Council firmly believe that Health, Safety, and Welfare has slipped down the list of fire service priorities.

That it has not received the prominence it deserves.

For example; when we hear of, and deal with some of the more serious cases of harassment or bullying, we are understandably and justifiably outraged at the harassers. However, when one of our members is seriously injured or killed, we feel no such similar outrage. Sorrow – yes; but outrage – no.

Would we willingly mingle with those who harass our members, as we often do at the funerals of our members with those who may be responsible for their deaths?

Unlike cases of harassment, we have a difficulty focusing our sense of outrage and blame. We are still reluctant to pursue someone after such a tragedy. We seem to accept that wilful and deliberate harassment is less acceptable than careless or irresponsible killing, and yet the consequences are no less traumatic.

Our members are rarely killed as a result of their own stupidity, hence the high success rate when we pursue litigation against a fire authority.

We will adopt a fresh approach to the entire area of our members’ safety.

We will ensure that our employers, senior managers, and members understand that we will be taking an entirely different approach should one of our members be seriously injured or killed.

The entire area of safety must be placed high on our agenda.

Standing still may ensure that our record of injuries and deaths may not increase.

What is clear however, is that if we are to improve the safety and health of our members, then our structures, strategies, and policies urgently need to be reviewed.

This document is a beginning in that process.