Foreword

Understanding Emergency Fire Control Rooms

Section 1 The Changed Environment

Section 2 Options Considered and Merits

Section 3 Barriers to Implementation

Section 4 Impactors

Section 5 International and UK Studies

Section 6 Summary of Experience

Section 7 The Ignored Issues

Section 8 Summary

Foreword

The Fire Brigades Union Response

The Fire Brigades Union rejects the findings and subsequently flawed recommendations of the Mott MacDonald Report for the Office of The Deputy Prime Minister’s titled “The Future of Fire And Rescue Service Control Rooms in England and Wales”. We recommend improvements to current service delivery and organisational development.

The Fire Brigades Union response goes further than just highlighting the inaccuracies and flaws of the Mott MacDonald report. It goes further by recommending positive improvements to current service delivery and organisational development. This builds improved responses and resilience whilst keeping local control of organisation and budgeting at local authority level. A level that allows for local responsibility
and accountability.

The majority of those at Fire Authority level, who actually understand the process, reject the flawed Mott MacDonald report for very much the same reasons the Fire Brigades Union reject them.

In their flawed report Mott MacDonald have put together a package of exaggerated and unquantifiable savings and underestimated costs with the sole intent of supporting faulty recommendations.

There is virtually no support for the flawed Mott MacDonald recommendations at Fire Authority level.

This has been recognised as being top down government. Bullying tactics have been used and this is forcing democratically elected local Fire Authorities into accepting a centrally decided policy over which they have no control.

Ultimately this will lead to local people paying more for less.

Not a single life will be saved for the massive investment which will be needed to implement the recommendations of this flawed report. And not one single improvement to the safety of the community and Firefighters will result.

Understanding Emergency Fire Control Rooms

It is important to understand, and Mott MacDonald clearly do not, the role of Emergency Fire Control rooms and the new Firefighter (Control) roles.

Mott MacDonald wrongly believe the role of Firefighter (Control) is essentially call taking and dispatch, which is one of the fundamental flaws of the report.

A point that even the ODPM recognises as being untrue.

In fact the ODPM’s own internal briefing has five densely typed pages listing in detail the work carried out in an Emergency Fire Control room.

The flawed Mott MacDonald report has chosen to ignore this much more accurate identification of the professionalism and skills needed in Emergency Fire Control rooms.

As a result the flawed Mott MacDonald report cannot be viewed as a substantive or accurate reflection on the Emergency Fire control needs of a modernised Fire and Rescue Service.

In moving to a modernised Fire and Rescue Service full support to all operational incidents is a critical factor. This needs full knowledge of the role of firefighters and at times the skills of individual officers to be fully understood by Firefighter (Control).

For example this includes the required level of emergency response to a specific type of incident, that response attending the correct address, and full support to all emergency responders be they Fire and Rescue or other services and agencies.

The emergency call itself requires great skill to extract the maximum information in the minimum amount of time, any delay in the obtaining accurate and relevant information impacts greatly on the safety of both Firefighters and the community. Keeping calm and giving appropriate Fire Survival guidance and maintaining personal contact with people who are often in danger, scared and confused, is an essential and specialist skill of Firefighters (Control). Lives have been saved and continue to be saved by using these skills.

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The Changed Environment

Changed Environment

Emergency Fire Controls are well aware of the changed environment following the horrific events of 9/11. Emergency Fire Controls - being critical to the organisation, management and application of all the changes – have had to identify, develop and implement new procedures.

Every Fire and Rescue Service in the country has used this to introduced new practices and procedures, which increase their ability to respond to incidents of this nature. Control
procedures are an absolutely critical and integral part of a Fire and Rescue Service response.

Emergency Fire Controls have adapted and changed since 9/11. In itself this is no different to how Emergency Fire Controls would adapt to any changed environment. It is inconceivable that the flawed Mott MacDonald report contains no acknowledgement of the changes already made within Emergency Fire Controls. It appears Mott MacDonald are unaware that significant change has already taken place in Emergency Fire Control rooms and it is a major criticism of the report that they have chosen to ignore the progress and claim that few changes have taken place.

New Dimension Terrorist Incidents

The size and scale of the incidents including the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon significantly changed the viewpoint of all emergency services including the Fire and Rescue Service. Being able to handle large scale new dimension terrorist incidents is given as a central justification in the flawed Mott MacDonald report for reducing the number of
Emergency Fire Controls.

Whilst acknowledging the increase in demands for the ability to deal with large scale incidents, Mott MacDonald propose to affect the Fire and Rescue Services ability to do so by reducing the number of Emergency Fire Controls. To suggest changes of this magnitude and impact would require considerable expertise in Risk analysis and assessment.

We are not aware of Mott MacDonald having any expertise in the field of Risk analysis and assessment – nor is it mentioned in the report – and therefore begs the question whether the issue was ever properly addressed. The flawed conclusions therefore do not appear to be based on substantive evidence, but are wrongly based on perception and misinformation. So much so they choose to ignore evidence from the Fire
Department New York after its experience on 9/11. Despite the enormity of the task Fire Department New York dealt with there is no intention to significantly change their procedures, including emergency call handling.

New York however, is making one very crucial and deliberate change, having learned from 9/11. They are proposing to move from one Control in New York to five smaller Controls.

This is precisely the opposite approach of the flawed Mott MacDonald’s recommendation for the UK, which is supposedly based on the same evidence!

The reason for the decision in New York to provide additional Control rooms is simple: more and smaller Control rooms provide much more resilience than one large central regional-style control room. If one smaller Control room fails for whatever reason then there are 4 others to rely on. That is what greater resilience means. It is about the ability to continue to provide a local emergency response through a variety of scenarios.

Other emergency services who would also form part of the instant response to any new dimension terrorist incident also understand this. None are making serious strides towards far fewer larger regional Control rooms.

In fact at present in England and Wales

Mott MacDonald’s flawed proposals would reduce the number of Emergency Fire Controls from the 49 existing local Emergency Fire Controls to just 9 larger Control rooms.

The simple fact of the matter is that reducing the number of Emergency Fire Control rooms to increase resilience and capability is an incredibly flawed approach.

That one Central Control covering a larger regional area does not lead to greater resilience or capability is illustrated by the London Control centre, at one time held up as a model for Regional Controls.

The London Fire Brigade Emergency Fire Control room has been relocated close to Canary Wharf. Even the most short sighted emergency planner would recognise that this location would be very high on any list of potential terrorist targets.

If Canary Wharf suffered a terrorist attack – it would put London’s Emergency Fire Control room out of action. Clearly demonstrating that this does not provide increased resilience it is in fact building in a substantial weakness built on poor planning.

The London model illustrates the flaws of the simplistic reasoning that bigger means more resilient and bigger means greater capability.

A wider civil contingencies planning National co-ordination centre is agreed as necessary to facilitate movement and support for a large number of resources and providing logistical support. The requirement for a National Operations Centre for logistical and strategic support is a matter that requires detailed consideration. However the Fire Brigades Union can perceive merits in such a structure.

The argument that its operation will be undermined by local Emergency Fire Service Control’s organisational arrangements and operational protocols is perplexing to say the least.

The organisational arrangements and operational protocols of the Fire and Rescue Service are driven by Fire-fighter’s requirements at incidents and not issues relating to Emergency Fire Service Controls. Emergency Fire Service Controls would expect the national co-ordination centre to deliver national direction and as such would respond in their usual professional manner. Emergency Fire Controls are not a barrier to implementation of national strategies and guidance. They are part and parcel of the system that delivers them.

Major Incidents

The report correctly states that the UK Fire and Rescue Service has evolved beyond its statutory duty to fight fire. It is now a multi-skilled all round Fire and Rescue Service.

The UK Fire and Rescue Service has suffered inordinately from the lack of substantial funding for this expanded role and, if the flawed Mott MacDonald report is to be believed, this is likely to continue.

The UK Fire and Rescue Service and its Firefighters (Control) has been dealing with a wide range of major incidents, some of them not principally fires, without receiving the recognition of the skills required to do this for many years.

Emergency Fire Controls have mobilised to and supported Firefighters at numerous major incidents on land, sea and air including incidents of note such as Lockerbie, Kings Cross and Bradford City football stadium disasters.

Further incidents that have required specialist team responses, such as the recent incident in Glasgow, were mobilised to and supported by Firefighter (Control).

The wide range and scope of these incidents proves the ability of existing Emergency Fire Controls to maintain an efficient and effective Fire Service in extreme circumstances.

All Emergency Fire Controls have been fully versed and trained in the response to New Dimension mass decontamination incidents. They have been fully briefed in the role and use of New Dimension equipment and the procedures and protocols and support required. The Fire and Rescue Service takes very seriously its expanding role and as such is constantly reviewing, changing and adapting procedures and Emergency Fire Controls are critical in this process.

Mott MacDonald were either unaware of all of this (which would be remarkable) or more likely have simply chosen not to acknowledge how the Fire and Rescue Service and Emergency Fire Control rooms have dealt with a number of major and varied incidents. In this regard the report verges on patronising ignorance in terms of the Service’s long standing ability to deal with any occurrence presented to it.

The flawed Mott MacDonald report takes the same approach to Fire and Rescue Services providing mutual assistance to each other. Mutual assistance crucially implemented by Emergency Fire Control rooms working
together. Mott MacDonald’s flawed report fails to understand or acknowledge that this is in fact standard practice and that the process has been in place for over fifty years! They insist that Regional Controls are needed for this to happen, which based on current practices is not only a ridiculous statement to make but is an unbelievable inaccuracy in what is purported to be an authoritative document.

Large scale incidents or protracted incidents beyond a Brigade’s existing capability have identified the need for formal mutual assistance procedures. This is not a new procedure and is regularly implemented for mutual benefit. In their flawed report Mott MacDonald have chosen deliberately to misrepresent this information.

Far from being a barrier local Emergency Fire Service Controls liaise with other adjoining Emergency Fire Service Controls in determining the requirement for and level of support needed and arranging for that response by utilising the procedures developed by those local Emergency Fire Controls themselves.

Resilience

Resilience is crucially important not just to the maintenance of Emergency cover at ALL times it is also important for the other critical functions performed within Emergency Fire
Control rooms. A national mobilising system would make national resilience difficult and Regional controls would substantially increase vulnerability. Exactly the opposite of what is being claimed.

Present systems already provide an extremely high level of resilience by the very fact that they differ, which of course amongst other things reduces the possibility of cyber terrorism and vulnerability to computer viruses.

Current numbers of Emergency Fire Controls actually protect them. This current resilience reduces the possibility of an occurrence (such as the ‘sasser worm’ which was built in a bedroom by an 18 year old and brought down the entire coastguards network) having a devastating effect
on the current Emergency Fire Control room structure. It makes the loss of one Emergency Fire Control less dangerous in its impact on the service.

Loss of a Regional Control on the other hand (the equivalent of around the loss of 6 current Control rooms), would severely impede the ability of the other regional controls to cope.

If failure was to occur on a common system as proposed for Regional Controls the whole of the country would fail to operate. And local knowledge would not be present to assist in the back up.

If system failure occurs at present the remainder of the Fire and Rescue Service continues to operate. The Emergency Fire Control that fails has a comprehensive and informed back up procedure which involves local knowledge. This
is achievable and within the scope of existing staff.

Separate systems increase rather than compromise resilience.

There are no proposals contained within the flawed Mott MacDonald report to state how system failure would be managed. Particularly when covering a much greater area and with a massive reduction in staff.

Emergency Fire Control
Activity Data

The CIPFA statistics used by Mott MacDonald in their flawed report are normally produced 12 months in arrears but in some parts of the flawed Mott MacDonald report they have used statistics that are 4 years out of date.

The Fire Control activity data section in the Mott MacDonald report selectively only uses emergency calls as its base for its assumptions instead of all Emergency Fire Control activity because of this it can only be undoubtedly flawed.

Whilst trying to predict the future fluctuations in incidents the flawed Mott MacDonald report assumes there will be a reduction in incidents from the figures compiled in 2001. As fire calls have increased on an average 9% over the last twelve months (these figures exclude any during the period of the dispute) Mott MacDonalds predictions are inaccurate and deceptive.

The breakdown of incidents in the flawed Mott MacDonald report only deals with fire incidents. There is no recognition at all in the figures of the number of incidents which involve the expanding role of the Fire and Rescue Service as a rescue service. e.g. Special Service Calls.

Whilst comparing the number of calls dealt with by each Emergency Fire Control the flawed Mott MacDonald report fails to recognise the expanded role of Emergency Fire Controls. There is absolutely no recognition of non-core activities carried out in the Emergency Fire Controls.

Mott MacDonald make a flawed assumption that because the mobile phone market will reach saturation point that calls will decline. This is a perplexing theory. One can assume that not all people who have a mobile phones call the Fire and Rescue Service when they witness an incident. Therefore how can it be assumed that capacity use ties in with capacity ownership.

Empirical evidence shows that the number of calls for assistance to the Fire and Rescue Service proves consistent significant year on year growth of emergency calls. The flawed Mott MacDonald report does not however take into account how this year on year increase will be dealt with by a much reduced staff.

The flawed Mott MacDonald report acknowledges that the numbers of Firefighters (Control) have been static for a number of years. Yet it ignores the issue of whether the numbers presently employed have been sufficient to maintain the service to the public.

It has long been an issue continually raised by the Fire Brigades Union that Emergency Fire Controls are understaffed, which results in high stress levels for Firefighters (Control) after overtime. As ever this issue is ignored.

The Fire Brigades Union believes that there is significant evidence to show that an increase in staffing is relevant and essential to maintain the current and continuing high levels of service delivery provided by the existing arrangements.

Maps

False Picture: Number of Incidents (Thousands)

Control Rooms

Indicative Numbers in thousands

Real Picture: Number of 999 Calls (Thousands)

Regional Fire and Rescue Service

Control Rooms

Number of 999 calls in thousands

Firelink

Radio replacement is not a new issue relevant to the debate about Regional Controls and the Firelink project was well underway prior to the incidents of 9/11. Firelink has been planned for so long it was originally under the auspices of the Home Office when it had responsibility for the Fire and Rescue Service.

Four options were examined: -

The majority, of those involved, favoured option 3 as the most suitable option. However, and somewhat perversely, option 4 was chosen. One of the resultant effects of this choice was that instead of a rollout programme completed by 2005 it would now slip to 2008 with potential for further slippage.

Significantly it was felt that this option was chosen due to police preference, at the time, for BT Airwave.

User evidence shows that Emergency services using new radio schemes now have serious Health and Safety concerns. This illustrates the inherent dangers and problems of ignoring professional advice and rushing into unproven fields with inadequate research.

Interoperability

The Flawed Mott MacDonald report makes reference to a current inability to communicate across organisational boundaries and geographical locations.

This, again, indicates a lack of understanding from those who prepared the flawed report.

It is a common experience to receive a call for an incident well outside the Fire and Rescue Service area covered and to forward that call to the appropriate Emergency Fire Control. Communication across boundaries is commonplace in dealing with “over the border” calls and ceded territory.

Emergency Fire Controls presently work across brigade boundaries providing operational support and information. To facilitate reciprocal arrangements in the case of evacuation of an Emergency Fire Control emergency call lines and radio channels have contained within them the ability to be switched across to a neighbouring brigade.

Mott MacDonald falsely claim that interoperability issues will be resolved with the introduction of regionalised controls. What they fail to recognise firstly are that there are NO issues to resolve and secondly that their proposal on regionalisation would increase their perceived difficulties due to much larger boundaries
between areas covered by Regional Controls.

Integrated risk management

Locally set Integrated Risk Management Plans are now coming on stream. These put much greater emphasis on local decision making with Fire and Rescue Service responses tailored to local needs and with greater emphasis on saving lives before property.

Regionalising Emergency Fire Control practices will not deliver locally based IRMP’s. Each brigade already has different procedures and working practices and this will increase with locally developed IRMPs. They cannot dovetail into a Regional Control structure.

Broad guidance on Emergency Fire Control practices are issued at national level however there is recognition of each area’s needs and uniqueness. This will always be the case as different chief officers have different priorities, different protocols, different political viewpoints and different diverse communities.

If applied properly, based on proper risk assessments and evidence-based decisions. IRMP’s have the ability to improve public and Firefighter safety. Applying IRMP’s wrongly will have disastrous effects.

The flawed Mott MacDonald acknowledges that IRMP’s will have a significant impact on Emergency Fire Controls and places great emphasis on the crucial decisions made in Emergency Fire Controls. Incredibly, or not perhaps surprisingly, Mott MacDonald ignore some of the Government’s own draft guidance which highlights the greater role of LOCAL Emergency Fire Controls delivering the local plan.

Risk management critically includes an emergency call from its inception.

The actions taken by the highly skilled Firefighter (Control) from time of receiving the call cannot be underestimated in terms of its critical importance and relevance. Whatever is done or not done at this time will directly impact on the success or failure of local IRMP’s.

Firefighters (Control) extend the ability of Firefighters to carry out successful rescues by using Emergency Call handling techniques.

Firefighters (Control) have the ability and skills to carry out remote risk assessment and advise persons at risk using Fire Survival guidance techniques. This is a critical part of the IRMP. Another critical function is the ability of a local Firefighter (Control) to calmly advise crews en route of location of persons in serious danger
potentially trapped by fire. Crucially Firefighters (Control) in a local Control have the capacity to maintain continual personal contact giving Fire Survival guidance and importantly offering personal support and comfort to persons who are often in life threatening circumstances.

Integrated Risk Management Plans

As service delivery is being driven by local assessment and local needs the flawed report fails to understand the central and increased role Emergency Fire Controls play in their local delivery of their service. What is clear is that it will be more important than ever for local knowledge to be part of the Firefighters (Control) remit.

This local knowledge goes beyond geographical knowledge and includes knowledge of local premises, appliances, specialist equipment.

Emergency Fire controls shouldn’t be taken in isolation. They are an integral part of the Fire Service and pivotal to the delivery of IRMP’s.

Local knowledge in existing Emergency Fire Control rooms is used extensively. A computer can and will give a list of possible alternatives. But it is up to the operator to narrow this down using Local knowledge as a tool. There are 9 Coronation Streets in Greater Manchester. The flawed proposals within Mott Macdonalds report to merge up to 9 counties presents the possibility of this being multiplied. It is only the local knowledge provided by Firefighters (Control) in a local Emergency Fire Control which will resolve any conflicting address options.

Local knowledge is also crucial in resolving difficulties with local dialects, accents and location names.

Some unanswered questions are how will the detailed local knowledge of topography and detailed local operating procedures - especially as required by local IRMPs - be handled by a Regional Control?

Also, how would local IRMP’s survive such failures when the Regional Control used as fallback will be even more remote?

Cost Model

Mott MacDonald in their flawed report clearly state they have made key assumptions that need to be considered when reviewing the costing figures.

One of those consideration is that “no attempt has been made to quantify the benefits of each of the options in terms of improved responses to incidents potentially resulting in saving of lives or reduction in property
damage”.

The costings are simply based on the flawed costings of the previous report which also never considered all the options.

Recent Cost models and projections put forward by the Government have been found to be purely speculative. They regularly overstate savings and underestimated true costs to justify change. The mix of Government driven change – especially that linked to the introduction of complex new technology – have been proven to typically end up as little more than a shambles.

One only has to consider the introduction of tax credits, the Criminal Records Bureau and the passport debacle to see a very poor track record in this field. The knee-jerk response is often to try and solve the problem by throwing more money at it.

Add in the purchase and commission of property sites (as Regional Controls will also entail) and the experience of the Scottish Parliament Office (estimate £45 million, currently running at £450 million) and the Greenwich Dome (£1 billion plus) does not add confidence.

Speculative costs bode ill for Local Authorities who face being lumbered with Regional Controls, which they do not support, foisted on them by Government at a time when council tax capping is once again a reality.

The cost model is based on cost per incident, as opposed to the number of calls which will greatly exceed the number of incidents, without any information being evaluated regarding savings per incident. The cost of
mobilising to an incident and early intervention with an accurate, adequate and timely attendance always outweighs the cost of getting it wrong which may mean loss of life and greater damage to property. One cannot be taken in isolation of the other.

The cost model is also based on root and branch replacement of Control room systems and savings on buildings. However present systems are built to be dynamic and do not need root and branch replacement (although the Government denies this, which is itself extraordinary). The systems are regularly updated in a cost-effective way.

Most Emergency Fire Controls are situated within existing Fire and Rescue Service premises which have dual purposes (the headquarters for example) and so there are much more limited savings than Mott MacDonald assume as these premises cannot be simply sold to generate revenue.

The costs for replacement systems have been estimated by Mott MacDonald at £1.5 million per brigade to calculate savings made by not replacing them but moving to regional controls. This exaggerates the savings as existing systems can be upgraded at a fraction of that cost, so generating greatly reduced savings.

The savings are also exaggerated because not all controls would need new systems or upgrades in any event, so even the exaggerated savings could not be applied to them.

The Fire Brigades Union believe that if all costs and options were open and accountable and auditable then the information would demonstrate that building on current systems rather than unnecessary root and branch renewal would be far more cost-effective.

Building on current arrangements would mean:

Costings and Statistics

Mott MacDonald themselves agree that not all the information to carry out a full and proper review is available.

In quantifying assumed costs the report fails to identify large areas of expenditure and simply assumes savings where none exist. This hugely undermines the entire cost basis on which Mott MacDonald builds its case for Regional Controls.

There are no costings identified for back up systems or premises. Support system costings, in terms of daily communications requirements, to enable the functioning of the proposed Regional Controls have similarly not been identified.

Present Emergency Fire Control rooms are significantly understaffed and as such work excessive overtime. No costings are evident for remedying staffing to adequate levels and there is no analysis of the cost of overtime.

The extra staff required to meet the additional extra duties that Firefighters (Control) presently carry out are identified as a saving. However if there is a requirement to carry out that work then additional staff will still need to be employed to complete that work. Therefore the flawed assumption of savings is unsound. The amount of extra duties carried out by Firefighter (Control) has neither been researched nor quantified therefore the numbers of staff required to cover these duties cannot be identified and it should not be identified as a saving.

The unsound assumptions impact on the numbers of staff required that have been wrongly predicted to crew the proposed Regional Controls.

Major assumptions are made without foundation that the numbers of calls will fall when they are on a clear upward curve.

The flawed Mott MacDonald report suggests that savings will be made due to an assumption that the number of incidents will reduce and will lead to a reduction in the number of calls being made to Emergency Fire Control rooms.

As all 999 calls within an Emergency Fire Control are treated of necessity as an emergency it is difficult to identify how savings between calls and incidents would be made.

The write off costs of present systems – being constantly updated rather than being renewed - are not identified but need to be factored in. Failure to acknowledge that most new systems do not require root and branch replacement but are constantly evolving is not quantified.

Based on recent figures it is mystifying in the extreme as to where these assumptions were obtained. In the ‘Invest to Save’ Brigades alone, the initial figures have been severely underestimated and they are proving far more costly than original predictions.

It is also worth looking at comparisons with other emergency services in terms of the costs and efficiency of Emergency Fire Control rooms.

The Fire Brigades Union in doing this would make 3 key points

Best Value

The Fire Brigades Union has and still does accept the principles of Best Value, but not when it is used as a mechanism for achieving cuts in the service and protection offered to the public. The Government defined best value as “a duty to deliver services to clear standards – covering both cost and quality – by the most
economic efficient and effective means available”. It also needed to combine development of a local
service to meet national needs.

Best Value was seen by Mott MacDonald as crucial in their initial study of Emergency Fire Controls. In fact it is still used as a benchmark throughout the service.

The new report effectively abandons Best Value as an approach as it is not, claims Mott MacDonald, an acceptable procedure for Emergency Fire Controls.

Mott MacDonald were unable to consider the Fire Brigades Union response to their initial flawed report and made a clear choice not to consider it in their current report.

Authorities, however, were instructed to consider the Fire Brigades Union response in their considerations on Best Value in Emergency Fire Control rooms. It is incredible that Mott MacDonald were either not aware of this or deliberately failed to consider the Fire Brigades Union response. The Fire Brigades Union believes this significantly compromises the accuracy of the report.

In making that statement the Fire Brigades Union recognises that 47 Fire Authorities having carried out their considerations and reviewing evidence on the principles of Best Value that their Emergency Fire Controls were proven to be efficient, effective and economically provided Best Value. Whilst the Fire Brigades Union may accept that one or two Authorities may have made mistakes, to accept that 47 made mistakes – effectively the position of Mott MacDonald – is beyond the realms of credibility.

When looking at comparators with other emergency services we find that LOCAL Emergency Fire Controls actually do deliver Best Value.

Options Considered and Merits

Building on Current systems and Arrangements

This is referred to by Mott MacDonald as “Status Quo Plus”.

This is summarily dismissed in the report without any research. The readers of the report cannot make a balanced decision when one of the main options is discounted from the outset.

By omission it implies that present arrangements are not already proven to be effective in operational and cost terms. This is patent nonsense and 47 Fire Authorities have
said so.

The current local systems and arrangements within the Fire and Rescue Service are efficient now in service delivery and no evidence has been provided in the flawed Mott MacDonald report to suggest that alternative arrangements would be anything more than just that, an alternative
arrangement.

These would be neither more effective, efficient or provide improved responses to incidents, potentially resulting in the saving of lives or any reduction in property damage.